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Abstract 
Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970) provide the germinal works for an economic 
analysis of crime, and their approach has been utilised to consider the response 
of crime rates to a range of economic, criminal and socioeconomic factors. Until 
recently however this did not extend  to a consideration of the role of personal 
indebtedness in explaining the observed pattern of crime. 
This paper uses the Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970) framework, and extends 
to a fuller consideration of the relationship between economic hardship and theft 
crimes in an urban setting. The increase in personal debt in the past decade has 
been significant, which combined with the recent global recession, has led to a spike 
in personal insolvencies. In the context of the recent recession it is important to 
understand how increases in personal indebtedness may spillover into increases in 
social problems like crime. 
This paper uses data available at the neighbourhood level for London, UK on 
county court judgments (CCJ’s) granted against residents in that neighbourhood, 
this is our measure of personal indebtedness, and examines the relationship between 
a range of community characteristics (economic, socio-economic, etc), including the 
number of CCJ’s granted against residents, and the observed pattern of theft crimes 
for three successive years using spatial econometric methods. 
Our results confirm that theft crimes in London follow a spatial process, that 
personal indebtedness is positively associated with theft crimes in London, and that 
the covariates  we have chosen are important in explaining the spatial variation in 
theft crimes. We identify a number of interesting results, for instance that there 
is variation in the impact of covariates  across crime types, and that the covariates 
which are important in explaining the pattern of each crime type are largely stable 
across the three periods considered in this analysis. 
JEL classification: R1; K42; C11; C21 
Keywords: Spatial econometrics; Theft crime; Personal debt default; Economic conditions 
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1    Introduction 
 
It is well recognised in the economics literature that borrowing plays an important 
role in household consumption  decisions, as Zeldes (1989) demonstrated  in testing 
the permanent income hypothesis.  Meanwhile,  one of the conclusions of the litera- 
ture stemming from Becker (1968) on the relationship between unemployment and 
crime, is that an increase in unemployment ought to be associated with increases in 
crime, as the unemployed  seek to maintain their consumption levels; a voluminous 
literature has tested whether this relationship holds (see for example: Cantor & 
Land (1985), Reilly & Witt  (1992), Osborn et al. (1992), Pyle & Deadman (1994), 
Elliott  & Ellingworth (1998), Carmichael & Ward (2001)). 
Meanwhile, the sociology and criminology literature has made clear that any 
complete theory of crime has to capture both the criminal motivation effect and 
the criminal opportunity effect. One of the main difficulties with understanding the 
relationship between unemployment and crime has been to disentangle the impact 
of increased unemployment in an area in terms of the motivation and opportunity 
components. Increased unemployment reduces legitimate income, increasing the 
attractiveness of illicit  sources of income, but at the same time increased unem- 
ployment in an area is likely to reduce criminal opportunity in that area due to 
increased numbers of residents staying at home or otherwise not being away from 
the area during working hours. 
There is a more fundamental difficulty  though with  the existing literature, 
specifically the proposition that  increased unemployment  will  lead to increased 
crime; that it ignores the important role, understood in the wider economics lit- 
erature, of borrowing in consumption smoothing.  The idea that  an individual 
becomes unemployed  and then seamlessly turns to crime as a substitute source of 
income,  seems unrealistic. A more believable proposition, is that an individual, 
facing economic hardship which reduces legitimate income, would first seek to run 
down their savings, then would borrow money from institutional and even infor- 
mal sources in order to support their current consumption, and only when their 
savings have been exhausted and they are liquidity constrained, might they resort 
to illicit  sources of income to support their consumption needs. 
In this sense, a better predictor for the relationship between economic hardship 
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and crime is a measure of personal indebtedness which is based on debt default. In 
this paper we utilise just such a measure, and using spatial econometric methods 
we test the association between debt default and theft crimes in London, UK using 
neighbourhood data for three successive years1.  Our model allows us to capture a 
range of both criminal motivation and criminal opportunity effects, as well as the 
important role played by spatial heterogeneity within the city-region, in explaining 
the observed pattern of theft crimes. 
 
 
2    Motivation 
 
The global recession beginning  in 2008 led to an increase in unemployment, de- 
creases in wages, and increases in debt default in many countries. In the decade 
prior to the 2008 recession there was a huge increase in personal debt in many 
countries, including in the UK and USA (as Figure 4 illustrates). Since 2008 there 
has been a reduction in the level of outstanding consumer credit, however it has 
only returned to 2005 levels in the UK and 2006 levels in the USA. Given the huge 
increase in personal debt in the preceding decade, it is perhaps little surprise that 
following the start of the 2008 recession we saw an increase in personal insolven- 
cies in the UK and the USA. Figure 5 shows the spike in personal insolvencies in 
England & Wales since 2008, and in personal bankruptcies in the USA from 20062. 
Against the backdrop of unprecedented  levels of consumer debt and spikes in 
personal insolvencies, the question arises whether there is any relationship between 
increases in the number of theft crimes observed and increases in personal debt 
default.  Unfortunately, we do not currently have neighbourhood  level personal 
indebtedness data for the  period of the recent  recession. However, if the level 
of personal indebtedness in a given community is indeed an important factor in 
explaining theft crime levels in that community, and in neighbouring communi- 
ties, evidence found in support of this relationship in economically  good times is 
1 We do not utilise panel data spatial econometric models at this stage because of data con- 
straints which we hope to overcome in the future.  However, there are studies which use these 
kinds of models to examine crime rates, a recent example is Benoit (2013). 
2 White (2007) explain the  sharp decline in non-business bankruptcies in the USA in 2006 
as arising from the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
which made “bankruptcy law much less debtor-friendly” (White 2007, 175). 
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arguably stronger evidence of this relationship than evidence obtained during peri- 
ods of general economic crisis; which is what this paper seeks to establish. Future 
work will seek to extend the database to consider the pre and post-2008 period. 
It has been frequently recognised in the crime literature that crime is a spa- 
tial phenomenon, and that in explaining observed crime rates it is necessary to 
control for more than simply the characteristics of an area, and to look to the 
characteristics of neighbouring  areas. In our study the starting point for examin- 
ing the spatial dimension to crime in London, and motivating the use of spatial 
econometric models, is the maps contained in Figures 1 - 3. 
Figure 1 shows the pattern of robberies in London in 2004/05. The map is 
coloured into 5 quintiles for easy reference with green indicating areas with robbery 
rates that place them in the lowest quitile and areas shaded red are areas with 
robbery rates in the highest quintile. It is clear from Map 1 that there is a thick 
donut of areas with low robbery rates (the darkest  green shading) in the areas 
of London which are furthest from the centre of the city, while the centre of the 
city has areas with much higher robbery rates. There is a clear spatial pattern to 
Figure 1. 
Figure 2 shows the rate of thefts of cars in 2004/05. Similar to Figure 1 there 
is a clear pattern to this map with areas surrounding  the centre of the city and in 
particular towards the east of London dominating the areas of high motor vehicle 
thefts. Neighbourhoods to the west of the centre of London are largely areas with 
vehicle theft rates in the lowest quintiles. One explanation for the high rates of 
vehicle thefts surrounding the centre of the city is the presence of ‘park and ride’ 
facilities in these areas which leads to a huge increase in vehicle numbers during 
the day, as commuters  opt to take public transportation into the centre of London 
rather than pay the congestion charge. 
Figure 3 shows the rate of dwelling burglary in 2004/05. Unlike the previous 
two maps, in this case there appears to be a wider dispersion of the areas of high 
crime away from the centre of the city with areas to the north and to the south 
of the city being the focus for most of the areas in the highest quintile of dwelling 
burglary. There are areas to the west which are in the top two quintiles for this 
crime, and the occasional area in the east which features in the top quintiles, but 
it is clear from Figure 3 that the main areas for dwelling burglary are to the north 
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of the city centre, and to the south of the city centre but across the River Thames. 
That  all three crimes have a spatial dimension is clear from Figure 1 - 3, 
although  each has a slightly different spatial pattern. The centre of the city appears 
to be an important ‘anchor’ around which crime takes place, but for each crime 
type the spatial focus of criminal activity is different. From these maps, and based 
on the existing literature, we hypothesis that these crime rates in London follow 
a spatial process. In order to capture this we use spatial econometric models, but 
we give no prior favour to any particular spatial model, and instead  use Bayesian 
posterior model comparison techniques to determine the spatial econometric model 
which best explains each crime type. 
 
 
3    Literature review 
 
This paper draws on three separate literatures on urban crime: criminology, soci- 
ology and economics.  In this section we briefly review the main contributions of 
each of these literatures, with a focus on the key message of each in motivating 
and understanding the observed pattern of urban crime, which we draw together 
in the final part of this section. 
 
 
3.1    Economics literature 
 
Becker (1968) provides the following means of thinking about the rational offend- 
ers’ decision to commit, or not, a crime. Defining y0 as the income in the absence 
of any criminal activity being undertaken by the individual, the payoff from not 
committing crime is taken as: 
 
UN C  = u(y0) (1) 
If the individual does engage in crime they obtain income y1 if not apprehended, 
tried, convicted, and given punishment F , and y1 − F otherwise; the condition is 
imposed that y1 −F ≤ y1. We also need to define the probability that the individual 
is apprehended  as p (it  is assumed that all individuals who are apprehended are 
tried, convicted, and punished with certainty).  The payoff from committing the 
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crime is therefore equal to p.(y1 − F ) + (1 − p).(y1); giving an expected utility  equal 
to: 
 
EUC  = p.u(y1 − F ) + (1 − p).u(y1) (2) 
Crime, under this approach, will  not occur (sometimes called the no-crime 
condition), where: 
 
UN C  > UC (3) 
Becker used this simple model to illustrate how, in the presence of a suffi- 
ciently large F and subject to a couple of other conditions3, p could be very low 
and crime could be eradicated. Thus costs incurred in maintaining a large p, for 
instance through law enforcement activity, could be saved. This simple model has 
provided the basis for a large empirical literature examining different aspects of 
the economics of crime, most importantly  for our purposes is the literature on 
the relationship between unemployment and crime; since it provides the closest 
parallel to our discussion of the relationship between financial hardship and crime. 
There is a large literature in economics looking at the relationship between 
economic conditions and crime (see for example Brenner (1971, 1976, 1978), Bren- 
ner & Harvey (1978), Cantor & Land (1985), Elliott & Ellingworth (1998), Pyle & 
Deadman (1994), Reilly & Witt  (1992), Osborn et al. (1992), Carmichael & Ward 
(2001)). Most, if not all, take their theoretical premise from the work of Becker 
(1968). An important strand of this literature focuses on the relationship between 
unemployment and crime, and there are mixed findings in this literature; some pa- 
pers find this relationship to be positive (Reilly & Witt  1992, Osborn et al. 1992, 
Elliott & Ellingworth 1998, Carmichael & Ward 2001), others find it to be negative 
(Cantor & Land 1985)4, while some find no or only weak evidence to support a 
relationship between unemployment and crime (Pyle & Deadman 1994). 
Part of the reason  why there is such a large literature in this area is that 
 
3 These are that individuals are risk neutral or risk averse, and the possibility of sufficiently 
severe punishments,  i.e. F lim → ∞. 
4 Cantor & Land (1985) find that the relationship between unemployment and crime is initially, 
and generally, negative, but for some crime types there is a lagged positive effect relating to the 
increase in the motivation effect. 
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increased unemployment in an area would likely impact on both sides of Becker’s 
(1968) model. Increased unemployment  reduces legitimate income, but equally 
increased unemployment  in an area will be expected  to increase the number of 
people at home during the day.  This would likely increase  the probability  of 
detection, for at least some types of crimes, in the local area (Osborn et al. 1992). 
It has now been recognised that both the motivation and detection components 
must be  captured in the analysis of this relationship.  There is an additional 
complication in this literature,  noted by Cantor  & Land (1985), that  being in 
employment creates opportunities for individuals to engage in criminal acts. 
One difficulty with the Becker (1968) theory itself is that it fails to account 
for the fact that not all of those who could financially benefit from crime resort 
to it.  This was a point recognised in Reilly & Witt  (1992) who appealed to the 
sociological concept of ‘social control’ (explained below) in explaining why some 
individuals resort to crime and others do not. A different approach was taken by 
Dhami & al Nowaihi (2012) in a recent paper which considered the Becker (1968) 
model in the context of non-expected utility  theory. 
This paper is of particular interest in providing a more flexible means of think- 
ing about the decision outlined in Equation 3 above; specifically, their extension of 
Becker (1968) using rank dependent utility  and cumulative prospect theory. It is 
clear that not everyone who could financially gain from committing a crime com- 
mits that crime; the difficulty with the expected utility  treatment is that it fails 
to reflect this reality.  The fact that that there exists a class of utility functions 
which capture the behaviour of individuals in overweighting low probability events, 
provides a useful means of thinking about the individuals decision about whether 
or not to commit a crime; better reflecting the observed level of criminality. 
The basic idea of cumulative prospect theory is that individuals evaluate de- 
cisions based on gains and losses relative to some reference point, and that losses 
hurt more than equivalent gains; in other words a loss of $100 causes a greater loss 
in utility  than a gain of $100 causes in increased utility.  The biggest problem with 
empirically estimating this class of utility  functions is determining the reference 
point which individuals use in evaluating their options. See Barberis (2012) for a 
review of prospect theory and its applications. 
In our case, where we are evaluating  the Becker (1968) models decision whether 
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to commit the crime or not, it is not clear, in general, what reference point an indi- 
vidual would use. However, when evaluating the impact of personal indebtedness 
it seems obvious  that there are no circumstances under which an increase in debt 
default could be considered a gain relative to any reference point. In this way we 
can consider increases in debt default as representing  losses relative to the indi- 
viduals reference point, and thus an increase in crime to offset these  losses a` la 
Becker (1968) would be anticipated. 
The starting point for Dhami & al Nowaihi (2012) in extending Becker (1968) 
is the introduction of a probability weighting function (pwf ), which they denote 
w(p). The pwf is used to transform the probabilities in Equation 2 from the linear 
in probabilities assumption of expected utility.   This gives a no crime condition 
(Equation 3) under rank dependent  expected utility  as: Γ(p, F ) = [1 − w(1 − 
p)]u(y1 − F ) + w(1 − p)u(y1) ≤ u(y0).  The essential point here is that expected 
utility  theory predicts a level of crime which does not accord with observed crime 
levels. However, by introducing probability weighting functions, we can derive a 
utility  function which better reflects the decisions individuals make and thus a 
model which better reflects observed levels of crime. 
The popularity of non-expected utility  theories of crime lies in their ability to 
explain why people overweight low probability events,  such as the probability of 
getting caught committing a crime5. This is only part of the story though, and the 
argument has been made before, in relation to tax evasion, that there are reasons 
beyond simply overweighting the likelihood of small probability events to explain 
the observed level of compliance with the law. 
In one study (Alm et al. 1992) it was shown that in experiments: “compliance 
is not always due to overweighting or to extreme risk aversion, since there is some 
compliance when there is no chance of detection and there is some evasion when 
the expected value of the evasion gamble is negative” (Alm et al. 1992, 36). This 
suggests that there are other reasons why people comply with laws that aren’t due 
to overweighting the probability of detection if they do not comply; otherwise why 
5 In the UK the probability of being caught and charged after stealing a car has been calculated 
(for 2002) at around 13%, the probability of then being convicted at around 7%, the chance having 
been convicted of being sent to jail at around 1% and the odds that you are then sentenced to 
more than three months in jail at 1 in 200 (see http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/news-releases/ 
car-thieves-enjoy-one-in-200-chance-of-getting-away-with-it-154572235.html) 
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would they comply when there is no probability of detection? 
In order to understand why personal indebtedness motivates a resort to crim- 
inality,  we rely upon Dhami & al Nowaihi’s (2012) extension of Becker (1968) 
using the cumulative prospect theory of utility  developed by Tversky & Kahne- 
man (1992). In addition, in our model we control for some of the ‘social’ factors 
which the literature argues are important; for instance population turnover as a 
proxy for the strength of social bonds. While part of the explanation for the fact 
that not everybody who could benefit from committing crime does so will lie in 
an overweighting of small probability events, another part of the explanation is 
related to the presence of social norms and conventions about which much has 
been written in the sociology literature, to which we now turn. 
 
 
3.2    Sociology &  Criminology literature 
 
In explaining the level of criminality in an area, sociologists have generally relied 
upon explanations related to the ecology of the area, the educational attainment 
of the population, the level of legitimate earnings, etc.  In the context of the 
unemployment-crime relationship raised earlier in the paper,  sociologists,  such as 
Box (1987), have emphasised the impact of anomie and a lack of legitimate means 
for advancement  in explaining the decision by those in economic downturns to 
resort to criminality. 
Box (1987) categorises the three schools of thought explaining why those ex- 
periencing economic hardship may resort to crime as: strain theory, control the- 
ory, and conflict theory.  Strain theory and conflict theory are both theories fo- 
cused on explaining the  individual level decision to engage in criminal activity. 
Strain theory, the name derives from the idea that certain experiences- for instance 
unemployment- can create ‘strain’ in the lives of those affected; encompasses the 
idea that those experiencing financial difficulty become alienated from society and 
feel relatively deprived, leading to a resort to illicit  sources of income. Conflict 
theory focuses on the role of stereotypes and profiling in driving those affected to 
conform with the stereotype. 
In terms of community characteristics,  control theory focuses  on the social 
bonds, or more broadly a sense of community, which acts to reinforce social norms 
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and deter a resort to criminality among those experiencing hardship. Of course the 
reverse holds and where social bonds are weak, it is anticipated that in response 
to the same hardship those residing in areas with weaker social ties will be more 
likely to resort to crime to augment their income. A good proxy for these social 
norms, and their strength in an area is the extent of population turnover.  It is 
intuitively  obvious that it is more difficult to establish social bonds and ties in an 
area where population turnover is higher6. This also relates to the Becker (1968) 
framework in affecting the expectation of deterrence. In areas with low social ties, 
and a high degree of turnover in the population, the probability of detection will 
likely be lower. 
To see this, consider that in relation to housebreaking, in areas with low social 
ties and high population turnover it is less likely that neighbours will be surprised 
by the presence of strangers or willing to challenge those they do not recognise. In 
areas with less social  chaos and disorganisation,  where people know their neigh- 
bours and are consequently more likely to challenge the presence of strangers, the 
probability of detection, and hence p in Equation 2, is expected to be greater. 
The criminology literature is vast in this area, but the relationship between 
economic downturns and crime was well summarised by Farrington et al. (1986): 
“unemployment  causes financial hardship, which in turn causes crime designed 
to alleviate that hardship...”  (Farrington et al. 1986, 335). A similar argument 
could be made about personal indebtedness, and indeed given that incurring debt 
may be the first stage of ‘coping’ for those experiencing financial hardship it is 
arguable that the presence of personal indebtedness represents an aggravated stage 
of financial hardship compared to becoming unemployed. 
In addition the criminology literature emphasises the importance of ecological 
determinants of crime, for instance that population density makes certain crimes 
riskier, for instance housebreaking,  as there is an increased probability of detection. 
For other crimes,  such as thefts from the person, the criminology literature tells 
us that higher population density should be associated with more of these crimes 
as it increases the potential victims. 
6 Chilton (1964) notes that in a study by Clifford Shaw population change and poor housing 
(along with TB, adult crime rate and mental disorders) were taken to represent a measure of 
social disorganisation which were found to be highly correlated with levels of juvenile delinquency. 
11  
 
 
3.3    Key  conclusions from the literature 
 
For our purposes in this paper there are some key issues arising from the literature. 
The framework from Becker (1968) provides us with a useful means to explain the 
observed pattern of crime. In order to do so we must control for a range of crim- 
inal opportunity (including factors influencing the probability of detection) and 
criminal motivation effects; for instance the importance of social disorganisation 
and chaos emphasised in the sociology literature, and the importance of variables 
such as population density as emphasised  in the criminology literature. 
It is clear from the literature that the best framework for explaining the ob- 
served level of criminality  is the non-expected utility  versions of Becker (1968) 
introduced by Dhami & al Nowaihi (2012). While an overweighting of low prob- 
ability  events helps to understand the observed level of criminality,  cumulative 
prospect theory provides an excellent means of thinking about the impact of per- 
sonal indebtedness on theft crimes. While in applications of cumulative prospect 
theory there is often some difficulty in determining the appropriate reference point, 
this is not an issue in extending the Becker (1968) model for our purposes.  Rela- 
tive to whatever reference point people use it is hard to see how debt default can 
be considered anything other than a loss relative to that reference point. In such 
a scenario a resort to an illicit  income source is surely more attractive. 
Given that our data here relate to a single city, variations in the punishment 
levied for different  offences  are unlikely to be large.  Even if,  in practice, the 
disposal of certain offences in certain courts in particular areas-  as a result of 
judicial heterogeneity-   does tend to carry a harsher sentence  than it would in 
courts in neighbouring  areas, it is unlikely that this is going to be significantly 
harsher and something which is common knowledge among the population. We 
outline our modelling approach in the following section. 
 
 
4    Data  & model 
 
We  use data from the UK  Neighbourhood Statistics website (neighbourhood. 
statistics.gov.uk) covering a range of economic, crime and socioeconomic vari- 
ables at the ‘super-output’ area level in this analysis. There are two ‘super-output’ 
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area levels; lower and middle, we utilise middle super output area (MSOA) data in 
this paper. There are 982 MSOA’s in London with a minimum resident population 
of 5,000 people and an average of 7,200. 
There are 6 theft crimes considered in this analysis (theft from the person, 
robbery, burglary of a dwelling, burglary of a non-dwelling, theft from a motor 
vehicle, and theft of a motor vehicle), of which 3 are presented here, these are: 
robbery, burglary of a dwelling and theft of a motor vehicle. All crime variables 
are converted into crime rates (crimes per 1000 people  usually resident) using 
population data. 
We include a range of economic and socioeconomic variables to capture both 
the criminal motivation and criminal opportunity effects defined  as important in 
the literature, these include: income in the area, the level of personal indebtedness 
in an area, a measure of the quality of the housing in an area, the composition of 
the population in terms of age (the more children and elderly people, the higher 
the resident population is likely to be during the day), the population turnover (as 
a measure of the strength of social ties), and population density (capturing one 
aspect of the probability of detection). 
Two of our variables are only available for the middle year of our analysis 
(housing in poor condition and average weekly household income). This means 
that  we are assuming that  the relative  values of these variables between  areas 
in each year is the same. While the use of these variables  in the previous and 
following years’ analysis is not ideal, it is the best that can be done given that we 
are working at a small spatial scale. Our spatial weight matrix is specified on the 
basis of contiguity. 
We estimate the three most common spatial econometric models in our anal- 
ysis, these are: the spatial error model (SEM) the spatial autoregressive model 
(SAR) and the Spatial Durbin model (SDM) (see LeSage  & Pace (2009) for a 
textbook exposition of these models). All  models are estimated using Bayesian 
spatial econometric methods with diffuse, relatively uninformative  priors speci- 
fied. Having calculated the three spatial econometric models (SAR, SEM, SDM) 
we calculate posterior model probabilities to select the best fit model, the results 
of which we then present.  All models are considered equally plausible ex-ante. 
Each of these models suggests a slightly different spatial process, and hence 
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motivation. These can be summarised  as follows: 
 
 
• In the SAR model spatial autocorrelation is exhibited in the dependent vari- 
able. From an econometric perspective, if the true data generating process 
(DGP) for the data is the SAR model, and one utilizes, for example, OLS 
for estimation purposes, the resulting coefficient estimates will be biased and 
inconsistent due to the endogeneity of the term on the right hand side of the 
equation (LeSage & Pace 2009). This model suggests that crime rates follow 
a spatial autoregressive  process, and hence crime rates in one area impact 
on crime rates in neighbouring  areas- consistent  with  the  standard crime 
spillover argument. 
 
• The SEM model posits that the spatial autocorrelation is found in the error 
term. It is possible that for a variety of reasons, when an econometric model 
is specified and estimated, certain factors that  should be included in the 
model are not and that these factors are correlated  over space, resulting is 
residual spatial error correlation. If the true DGP is the SEM model and, 
again for example, OLS is used in the estimation, the OLS estimators of the 
coefficients are unbiased but inefficient and the estimates of the variance of 
the estimators are biased (LeSage & Pace 2009). 
 
• The SDM model extends the SAR model by including spatially weighted 
explanatory variables. LeSage & Pace (2009) suggest that the SDM model 
should be used when one believes that there may be omitted variables that 
follow a spatial process and are correlated with included independent vari- 
ables. 
 
 
5    Empirical  results 
 
In this section we recap the results previously presented in McIntyre & Lacombe 
(2012) and discuss the results from the extended analysis in this paper.  This 
previous work was carried out using fewer explanatory variables, for instance we 
did not include the proportion of elderly people in the population for each area. 
In the analysis in this paper we consider a broader range of explanatory variables 
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which we feel better capture the factors which will  influence the  probability of 
detection in an area. 
In our extended results we present, for each theft crime type, a model using 
the number of CCJs granted in each area as our measure of personal indebtedness, 
but we also include a measure of the proportion of these which are of valued at 
over £1000 and also a measure of those which are valued at less than £251. In 
our earlier work we focussed on the total value of CCJs as our measure of personal 
indebtedness, however in order to investigate whether the distribution of the value 
of CCJs matters in explaining theft crime rates, we needed to use the number of 
CCJs as our initial measure of indebtedness in this analysis. In the results which 
follow we calculate  95% and 99% credible intervals, and where the interval does 
not include 0, i.e. the credible intervals have the same sign, these are considered 
significant at the appropriate level. Coefficients with a ‘*’ after them in Tables 2 
- 4 are those which are considered significant at the 95% level. 
 
 
5.1    Results from McIntyre &  Lacombe (2012) 
 
Table 1 presents the regression results published in McIntyre & Lacombe (2012). 
In interpreting these results, we need to first explain the distinction between the 
direct  and indirect  effects. The direct  effects are the impact of our explanatory 
variable in that  area on our dependent  variable in that  area; for instance the 
impact of income in Shoreditch on robbery rates in Shoreditch. The indirect effect 
is the impact of the explanatory variable in one area, on the dependent variable 
in neighbouring  areas; for instance the impact of income in Shoreditch on robbery 
rates in Bethnal Green (see LeSage & Pace (2009) for more on this). 
These results demonstrate a number of things; firstly the importance of spa- 
tially modelling crime data, secondly the importance of personal indebtedness in 
explaining the observed pattern of theft crimes, and also the consistency of these 
results with economic, criminal and sociological theories of crime. To pick out a 
couple of results; we can see from Table 1 that poor quality housing is positively 
and directly associated with all crime types, this is consistent with an ecological 
view of crime. Areas with poor housing provide better opportunities for burglary, 
are likely to be poorer quality neighbourhoods more generally (for instance by 
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being poorly lit,  making personal theft crimes easier), and it is also likely that 
poor quality housing will be associated with poorer quality motor vehicles which 
are easier to steal. 
Income meanwhile is negatively associated with robbery, non-dwelling burglary 
and theft of a motor vehicle. To take thefts of a motor vehicle, it makes sense that 
richer people will have better motor vehicles which are more difficult to steal, and 
therefore higher income areas would see fewer  thefts of cars.  In richer areas it is 
also likely that non-dwellings will be rarer, and thus burglaries of non-dwellings in 
this area will be less frequent. 
In terms of personal indebtedness, the value of CCJs is positively associated, 
both directly and indirectly, with robbery and theft from the person, this suggests 
that where personal indebtedness is high in an area, personal thefts are higher in 
that area and in neighbouring  areas. These crimes are, arguably, two of the least 
‘skilled’ theft crimes possible and thus could be considered ‘entry level offenses’, 
which would be consistent with the notion of individuals turning to crime in re- 
sponse to economics hardship. Housebreaking and car theft are relatively ‘skilled’ 
crimes which are likely to be beyond the abilities of those turning to crime in the 
face of economic hardship, as opposed  to  those for whom criminality  is a more 
routine activity. 
Building on these results there are certain features which we want to examine 
further in this paper. While we have included a measure of personal indebtedness 
in our initial  regression results, we are interested to understand whether the im- 
portance of personal indebtedness in explaining crime patterns varies according to 
the size of the debt. In addition, and focussing on the issue of deterrence and the 
probability of detection, we also include here a measure of the proportion of the 
population which is elderly. Finally, given that population turnover is taken as 
a proxy for the strength of social ties, we experiment with different measures of 
population turnover. 
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5.2    Further results 
 
Tables 2-4 present the initial results from our spatial econometric analysis of three 
types of crime in London for the years 2003 to 20057. We have again, as is standard 
in the spatial econometrics literature,  calculated the direct, indirect and total 
effects estimates  for each variable.  We  calculate the mean effects and the 95% 
and 99% credible intervals for each variable, and where the credible interval does 
not contain zero, it can be considered  statistically significant at that level. The 
spatial coefficient in all our models is highly significant, with the credible interval 
not spanning zero, verifying that the crime rates being modelled follow a spatial 
process. 
Taking our results in turn, from Table 2 we can see that for robberies our re- 
sults for all three years are largely consistent. The only difference is that only in 
2003 is the proportion of CCJs valued at greater than £1000 is positively associ- 
ated with robberies both directly (i.e. within that neighbourhood) and indirectly 
(in neighbouring areas). Poor housing condition is positively associated with rob- 
beries in all years, which as before  is consistent with the ecological explanation 
for crime. Otherwise, in all years the variables which capture the probability of 
detection (net changes in population and population density) are negative  and 
significant, suggesting that weak social ties and population density are related to 
fewer robberies in that area. 
For population density, this conclusion differs from previous work which sug- 
gests that for personal theft crimes,  such as robbery, population density is posi- 
tively associated with these crimes; the argument being that the higher the popu- 
lation density the greater the potential victims. In initial work for the North East 
of England region we found this relationship to be negative and significant. We 
will explore this issue further as part of our future activities; looking simply at 
the raw data on population densities shows that the London city-region and the 
North East England region have vastly different scales for population density and 
so perhaps  this offers some explanation  for our different findings. 
In terms of the motivation components, we can see that income is negatively as- 
 
7 A shortage of time in preparing this manuscript is the only reason for the absence of the 
results for the other crime types. 
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sociated with robberies in all years, while the proportion of males in the population 
and the net inflow of males aged 16 to 24 are positively associated with robberies 
in the area, and in neighbouring  areas. In terms of personal indebtedness,  as ex- 
pected, the greater personal indebtedness, the greater number of robberies which 
are observed in that area (directly) and in neighbouring  areas (indirectly).  These 
results are consistent  with our earlier findings and with our prior expectations 
based on the existing literature. 
One thing to note before continuing, is that we included the % of OAPs in the 
population and the % of the population which is aged 0-15 in order to capture 
differences in the population of an area during the day (our belief being that the 
more young children and OAPs in an area the higher the daytime population of 
an area and hence the lower the levels of crime). In the case of robberies, neither 
of these variables is significant. However, this makes sense to us, as robberies  are 
not the type of crime for which people being at home during the day are likely 
to increase the detection and hence deterrence effect, unlike car thefts and home 
burglaries to which we now turn. 
Turning to Table 3 we can see that, again, there is a high degree of consistency 
over time in explaining thefts of motor vehicles. Higher income is associated with 
fewer theft of cars (perhaps  because richer people purchase cars which are more 
difficult  to steal), while housing in poor condition is positively associated with 
thefts of cars (perhaps because poor quality housing is correlated with poor quality 
cars which are easier to steal). 
In the case of thefts of cars, the proportion of OAPs (old age pensioners)  in 
the population is negatively associated with thefts of cars. As we said earlier, we 
included the % of OAPs in the population in our model to capture the deterrence 
effect of people being at home during the day. Given that in a city such as London 
a high proportion of commuters travel by public transport, leaving cars at home, 
it makes  sense that the greater the proportion of elderly people in an area the 
greater the probability of detection while stealing a car in that area. 
Some variables are important only in 2003 and 2005, for instance the net inflow 
of 15 to 24 year olds, we have no intuition  for this inconsistency over time, but 
we do note that where it is significant it accords with our expectations in being 
positively associated with thefts of motor vehicles. In all years the number of 
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CCJs granted in an area is positively associated with thefts of motor vehicles in 
that area and in neighbouring  areas, as expected. 
In the final set of results in Table 4, our results are more varied across the three 
years. Certain results are consistent over time, these are: that greater population 
density is negatively associated with home burglaries, that  the greater the net 
inflow of 15 to 24 year olds the greater the number of burglaries, that the more 
houses in poor condition the more burglaries-  as would be expected- and finally 
that the greater the proportion of the population which are children (aged 0-15) the 
fewer burglaries which occur. These are all in line with our expectations regarding 
criminal motivation and opportunity. 
The greater the population density in an area, the greater the risk of detection 
when breaking into a home. So we would expect, and we find in our results, that 
the higher the population density is in an area, the fewer burglaries of dwellings 
that take place in that area. The more young children in an area the higher the 
occupancy rate of homes during the day and hence the greater the probability 
of detection when breaking into a dwelling, which explains why- in all years -the 
higher the share of children in the population the lower the rate of home burglaries. 
In the case of the % OAPs this is only significant in the middle year, but it similarly 
suggests that the more elderly people the lower the rate of housebreaking which 
accords with our prior expectations and theory. 
The number of CCJs granted in an area is positively and significantly associated 
with burglaries in the first two years, but not 2005, although in 2004 and 2005 
the proportion of CCJs valued at less than £251 is significantly  and positively 
associated with house burglaries in that area. In terms of the indirect results, the 
impact on neighbouring  areas, in each period there is a positive and significant 
impact of one or more of our measures of personal indebtedness on burglaries of 
dwellings in neighbouring areas. 
In terms of the income variable, we  see that income in an area is positively 
associated with house breaking  in that area. This would be expected in the sense 
that the richer the area, the more valuable the potential loot. However,  we also see 
that income is negatively related to burglaries in neighbouring  areas, which again 
makes  sense and captures the criminal motivation effect. To explain this point, 
note that this result means that the lower the income in areas neighbouring  area 
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‘A’ the greater the rate of house breaking in area ‘A’. If the potential loot from 
housebreaking is taken to be a function of income, then if income in neighbouring 
areas is lower than in area ‘A’, criminals in neighbouring  areas may travel to the 
higher income area (area ‘A’) to break into homes; this would explain the negative 
indirect effect income coefficient8. 
 
 
6    Conclusion 
 
This paper has analysed the relationship between a range of economic and socioe- 
conomic variables and three theft crime for London in the year 2003 to 2005. We 
have seen that there is broad consistency between our results for all three years 
of this analysis. We have also seen, again, the important role of personal indebt- 
edness in explaining the observed pattern of theft crimes. Building on the earlier 
analysis in McIntyre & Lacombe (2012) we have extended  to consider both the 
preceding and succeeding years data, but also a broader range of covariates. Our 
results reinforce the findings of McIntyre & Lacombe (2012) and extend them in 
a useful manner. 
Future research will seek to employ panel data spatial econometric methods 
to further explore this urban crime relationship; there are data issues which are 
impeding this research at the moment, but  which we hope to overcome in the 
future.  In addition, we are seeking to expand our database to include data for 
subsequent years. Of particular interest is the period covering the recent global 
recession.  We have also explored a comparison of these results across the urban 
hierarchy, in other words comparing different types of regions, and the consistency 
of the results obtained here, in that context. Again, we are somewhat limited in 
terms of the geographic coverage of our data at the neighbourhood level, but this 
remains an important future topic of research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Benoit (2013) motivates his crime analysis for Chicago, USA using routine activity  theory, 
and the idea that individual potential criminals move routinely over space to identify opportu- 
nities to commit crimes. Our results here could also be interpreted in this context. 
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Figure 1: Robbery Rate 2004-05 
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Figure 2: Theft of Motor Vehicle Rate 2004-05 
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Figure 3: Burglary Rate 2004-05 
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Figure 4:  Consumer credit in the UK (Monthly  amounts outstanding of other 
consumer credit lenders (excluding the Student Loans Company) net unsecured 
lending to individuals (in sterling millions) seasonally adjusted. Source:  Bank of 
England.)  and USA (USA Total Household Debt Balance. Source: New York 
Federal Reserve). 
 c 
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Figure 5:  Total  individual insolvencies iwEngland  and  Wales  (Source: The  Insol- 
vency  Service)   and  US  non-business bankruptcy (Source: American Bankruptcy 
Institute). 
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Table 1: Results from McIntyre & Lacombe (2012) 
 
Direct  Effects 
Total theft crime  Robbery Thefts from  the person  Burglary (dwelling) Burglary (non-dwelling)    Theft of a motor vehicle      Theft from  a motor vehicle 
 
Variablea 
 
Total value  of CCJ  0.042409*  0.052907*  0.028842*  0.048024 0.021826 0.045246 0.021859 0.014861 0.070862 0.008218 0.098538 0.013721 0.044395 -0.005206  0.101342 -0.006259  0.05222 -0.005248  0.098555 -0.015282  0.060759 
Population turnover -0.029125  -0.093255*  -0.017263*  -0.018755  0.032034*  0.051031 -0.057141* -0.058312  0.000484 -0.140468  -0.046402  -0.031742  -0.00341  -0.075204 0.037628 0.001167 0.063877 -0.004437  0.105769 -0.104119  -0.008691 
% pop 0-15 -0.114694*  -0.088632*  -0.049357*  -0.137225*  -0.114743*  -0.005737  -0.093292* -0.148144  -0.081403  -0.135958  -0.042599  -0.065379  -0.032595  -0.195804  -0.079955  -0.150685  -0.079409  -0.060739  0.048788 -0.14504  -0.04002 
% pop 16-24 0.018417 0.032295 0.018358 0.012747 -0.008921  -0.014946  -0.013851 -0.016 0.052798 -0.013548  0.078957 -0.000483  0.038344 -0.041144 0.063968 -0.048649  0.031807 -0.066877  0.036644 -0.064036  0.03708 
Houses in poor  condition 0.152809*  0.20791*  0.036598*  0.193533*  0.148241*  0.207798*  0.147422* 0.116301 0.189254 0.15427 0.261198 0.018556 0.054413 0.13133 0.255762 0.107559 0.190581 0.147848 0.268447 0.085791 0.208878 
Income  -0.03769  -0.128778 * -0.010277  -0.005129  -0.060871*  -0.245493*  0.026041 -0.075318  0.000913 -0.177162  -0.080843  -0.028143  0.007479 -0.066846  0.055478 -0.10126  -0.019853  -0.307307  -0.185489  -0.035965  0.087888 
Pop.  Density -0.177331*  -0.091997 * -0.032506*  -0.043521  -0.25308*  -0.186242*  -0.271474* -0.217521  -0.137664  -0.143314  -0.042226  -0.05226  -0.012719  -0.10747  0.020301 -0.294356  -0.211345  -0.245536  -0.127107  -0.335681  -0.208146 
 
 
Variable Mean 
Indirect Effects 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Total value of CCJ  0.03027 0.064071*  0.046423*  0.083663 0.047797 0.086674 -0.039542 -0.064107  0.125438 0.009897 0.124665 0.00807 0.086611 -0.00901  0.18338 -0.046854  0.143328 -0.009904  0.196037 -0.224977 0.151226 
Population turnover 
 
% pop 0-15 
0.063163 
0.266374 
0.125105 
-0.072075  0.136377 -0.171413  -0.049548  -0.026219  0.058783 -0.367988  -0.131043  0.027995 0.24467 -0.115981  0.094577 -0.088696  0.34125 
% pop 16-24 0.00223 0.039001 0.026522 0.02219 0.105958*  -0.028573  0.070643 -0.088924  0.095647 -0.016007  0.097283 -0.013042  0.067815 -0.071789  0.116781 0.005514 0.214597 -0.130178  0.069938 -0.110926  0.263204 
Houses in poor  condition -0.012914  0.251731*  -0.043823*  0.337228*  -0.121784*  0.397924*  -0.056926 -0.124976  0.097443 0.174024 0.34523 -0.085887  -0.001158  0.212912 0.485507 -0.234722  -0.009861  0.265552 0.560172 -0.28305  0.168528 
Income  -0.097335  -0.155991 * 0.024979 -0.009183  0.036346 -0.47025 * -0.001648 -0.205243  0.008271 -0.228858  -0.092079  -0.016828  0.065115 -0.116569  0.097782 -0.068749  0.137673 -0.646394  -0.326188  -0.212181  0.209213 
Pop.  Density 0.301043*  -0.11136*  0.130996*  -0.075664  0.258524*  -0.357022 * 0.653776* 0.199629 0.406187 -0.182301  -0.049584  0.0897 0.173463 -0.196053  0.035964 0.152672 0.360941 -0.514398  -0.225429  0.434052 0.879784 
 
 
Variable 
Total Effects 
 
Total value  of CCJ  0.072679 0.116978*  0.075265* -0.029645  0.176041 0.0185 0.222306 0.032473 0.119657 
Population turnover -0.062027  -0.206126*  -0.006335 -0.166735  0.044188 -0.318855  -0.101496  -0.048145  0.037132 
% pop 0-15 -0.081606  -0.195893*  -0.031845 -0.188514  0.025931 -0.303853  -0.092583  -0.075931  0.009959 
% pop 16-24 0.020647 0.071296 0.044881* -0.074489  0.118294 -0.029426  0.174289 0.00538 0.086997 
Houses in poor  condition 0.139894*  0.459641*  -0.007225 
-0.017683 
-0.218271  0.188776 
0.006022 
-0.21991  0.225781 
0.031813 
-0.193935  0.259488 
0.056792 
-0.130624  0.254315 
0.090497 
0.025157 0.252945 0.332291 0.597431 -0.050719  0.036665 0.351657 0.737053 -0.089578  0.142861 0.415704 0.812854 -0.149321  0.330016 
Income  -0.135025* -0.24287  -0.031073 
Pop.  Density  0.123712* 
0.024393 
0.240794 
.382302* 
0.020149 0.234847 -0.324185  -0.092563  0.055735 0.140618 -0.303163  0.055888 -0.101712  0.11316 -0.751249  -0.355928  0.155619 0.626589 
 
a A ‘*’ next to the mean effect estimate indicates that the variable is considered statistically significant at the 95% level. 
R-squared 
Rbar-squared 
0.4243 
0.4177 
0.4180 
0.4114 
0.4003 
0.3935 
a A ‘*’ next to the mean effect estimate indicates that the variable is considered statistically significant at the 95% level. 
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Table 2: Results - Robbery 
 
Direct  Effects 
 2003     2004     2005   
Variable  Namea Lower 99% 
 
Lower 95% 
 
Coefficient 
 
Upper 95% 
 
Upper 99% 
 
Lower 99% 
 
Lower 95% 
 
Coefficient 
 
Upper 95% 
 
Upper 99% 
 
Lower 99% 
 
Lower  95% 
 
Coefficient 
 
Upper 95% 
 
Upper 99% 
 
Average weekly income 
 
-0.2320 
 
-0.2114 
 
-0.1484* 
 
-0.0851 
 
-0.0666 
 
-0.1965 
 
-0.1751 
 
-0.1137* 
 
-0.0533 
 
-0.0304 
 
-0.2155 
 
-0.2005 
 
-0.1369* 
 
-0.0716 
 
-0.0504 
Percentage of  pop. aged  0-15 -0.1244 -0.1058 -0.0449 0.0169 0.0363 -0.1270 -0.1091 -0.0539 0.0007 0.0186 -0.1318 -0.1169 -0.0581 0.0002 0.0156 
Percentage of  pop. male aged  0-15 -0.0439 -0.0299 0.0200 0.0699 0.0839 -0.0358 -0.0221 0.0258 0.0770 0.0992 -0.0516 -0.0346 0.0171 0.0719 0.0908 
%  of  males in population -0.0069 0.0090 0.0658* 0.1205 0.1380 0.0170 0.0324 0.0815* 0.1322 0.1445 0.0114 0.0281 0.0794* 0.1318 0.1477 
%  OAPs in population -0.0720 -0.0495 0.0165 0.0808 0.0987 -0.0325 -0.0153 0.0485 0.1108 0.1329 -0.0522 -0.0298 0.0341 0.0988 0.1191 
Houses in poor condition 0.1324 0.1494 0.2056* 0.2639 0.2812 0.1292 0.1468 0.2055* 0.2641 0.2811 0.0777 0.1003 0.1579* 0.2167 0.2338 
Net change in population -0.1500 -0.1336 -0.0810* -0.0268 -0.0106 -0.1376 -0.1229 -0.0719* -0.0206 -0.0059 -0.1718 -0.1569 -0.1054* -0.0543 -0.0357 
Net inflow 15  to 24 0.0445 0.0689 0.1426* 0.2170 0.2383 0.0226 0.0361 0.0819* 0.1341 0.1540 0.0735 0.0900 0.1530* 0.2318 0.2570 
Population density -0.1589 -0.1430 -0.0902* -0.0354 -0.0186 -0.1573 -0.1404 -0.0856* -0.0296 -0.0145 -0.1577 -0.1408 -0.0858* -0.0277 -0.0096 
Number of  CCJ’s granted 0.0091 0.0291 0.0835* 0.1372 0.1526 0.0202 0.0361 0.0897* 0.1436 0.1605 -0.0031 0.0158 0.0719* 0.1284 0.1472 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at greater than 1000 -0.0151 0.0014 0.0478* 0.0954 0.1105 -0.0188 -0.0045 0.0429 0.0898 0.1025 -0.0365 -0.0247 0.0227 0.0706 0.0845 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at less  than 251 -0.0434 -0.0317 0.0101 0.0518 0.0654 -0.0115 -0.0012 0.0391 0.0812 0.0931 -0.0452 -0.0339 0.0082 0.0510 0.0634 
 
Indirect  Effects 
2003  2004  2005 
 
Variable Name Lower 99%         Lower 95%  Coefficient        Upper 95%         Upper 99%  Lower 99%         Lower 95%  Coefficient        Upper 95%         Upper 99%  Lower 99%         Lower 95%  Coefficient        Upper 95%         Upper 99% 
 
 
Average weekly income 
 
-0.2493 
 
-0.2173 
 
-0.1414* 
 
-0.0748 
 
-0.0600 
 
-0.2437 
 
-0.2123 
 
-0.1298* 
 
-0.0579 
 
-0.0344 
 
-0.2503 
 
-0.2182 
 
-0.1399* 
 
-0.0707 
 
-0.0479 
Percentage of  pop. aged  0-15 -0.1249 -0.1041 -0.0428 0.0158 0.0334 -0.1490 -0.1282 -0.0615 0.0007 0.0219 -0.1484 -0.1251 -0.0595 0.0002 0.0165 
Percentage of  pop. male aged  0-15 -0.0449 -0.0284 0.0191 0.0677 0.0851 -0.0404 -0.0250 0.0294 0.0900 0.1134 -0.0551 -0.0357 0.0174 0.0739 0.0942 
%  of  males in population -0.0068 0.0089 0.0628* 0.1211 0.1436 0.0188 0.0352 0.0931* 0.1562 0.1776 0.0121 0.0287 0.0811* 0.1401 0.1605 
%  OAPs in population -0.0726 -0.0476 0.0156 0.0803 0.0992 -0.0364 -0.0166 0.0553 0.1304 0.1575 -0.0539 -0.0303 0.0346 0.1020 0.1253 
Houses in poor condition 0.1093 0.1289 0.1960* 0.2763 0.3091 0.1324 0.1536 0.2347* 0.3284 0.3588 0.0754 0.0968 0.1613* 0.2414 0.2728 
Net change in population -0.1529 -0.1331 -0.0771* -0.0248 -0.0101 -0.1675 -0.1470 -0.0820* -0.0230 -0.0066 -0.1936 -0.1706 -0.1078* -0.0522 -0.0354 
Net inflow 15  to 24 0.0424 0.0629 0.1357* 0.2200 0.2503 0.0240 0.0395 0.0934* 0.1593 0.1853 0.0691 0.0880 0.1561* 0.2474 0.2866 
Population density -0.1651 -0.1460 -0.0860* -0.0318 -0.0168 -0.1968 -0.1691 -0.0979* -0.0334 -0.0145 -0.1715 -0.1542 -0.0878* -0.0276 -0.0090 
Number of  CCJ’s granted 0.0080 0.0262 0.0795* 0.1384 0.1560 0.0212 0.0405 0.1024* 0.1710 0.1926 -0.0032 0.0150 0.0735* 0.1367 0.1564 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at greater than 1000 -0.0144 0.0012 0.0456* 0.0937 0.1067 -0.0228 -0.0053 0.0490 0.1066 0.1246 -0.0380 -0.0254 0.0231 0.0724 0.0887 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at less  than 251 -0.0429 -0.0305 0.0096 0.0501 0.0662 -0.0123 -0.0014 0.0447 0.0952 0.1164 -0.0482 -0.0349 0.0084 0.0527 0.0701 
Total Effects 
2003  2004  2005 
 
Variable Name Lower 99%         Lower 95%  Coefficient        Upper 95%         Upper 99%  Lower 99%         Lower 95%  Coefficient        Upper 95%         Upper 99%  Lower 99%         Lower 95%  Coefficient        Upper 95%         Upper 99% 
 
 
Average weekly income -0.4733 -0.4235 -0.2897* -0.1618 -0.1301 -0.4350 -0.3813 -0.2436* -0.1122 -0.0648 -0.4570 -0.4141 -0.2768* -0.1440 -0.0986 
Percentage of  pop. aged  0-15 -0.2480 -0.2074 -0.0877 0.0326 0.0684 -0.2731 -0.2355 -0.1155 0.0014 0.0409 -0.2795 -0.2412 -0.1177 0.0003 0.0321 
Percentage of  pop. male aged  0-15 -0.0894 -0.0585 0.0391 0.1363 0.1656 -0.0738 -0.0470 0.0552 0.1654 0.2084 -0.1064 -0.0706 0.0345 0.1455 0.1850 
%  of  males in population -0.0137 0.0181 0.1286* 0.2408 0.2781 0.0359 0.0682 0.1745* 0.2850 0.3179 0.0237 0.0584 0.1606* 0.2689 0.3036 
%  OAPs in population -0.1415 -0.0971 0.0322 0.1619 0.1992 -0.0692 -0.0321 0.1038 0.2378 0.2874 -0.1056 -0.0589 0.0687 0.1991 0.2411 
Houses in poor condition 0.2483 0.2845 0.4016* 0.5352 0.5763 0.2694 0.3028 0.4402* 0.5802 0.6203 0.1546 0.1988 0.3192* 0.4496 0.4922 
Net change in population -0.2965 -0.2634 -0.1581* -0.0526 -0.0212 -0.3024 -0.2661 -0.1540* -0.0445 -0.0126 -0.3586 -0.3231 -0.2131* -0.1074 -0.0693 
Net inflow 15  to 24 0.0867 0.1325 0.2783* 0.4311 0.4805 0.0466 0.0761 0.1754* 0.2907 0.3345 0.1457 0.1800 0.3091* 0.4723 0.5362 
Population density -0.3199 -0.2853 -0.1763* -0.0682 -0.0349 -0.3485 -0.3062 -0.1836* -0.0637 -0.0290 -0.3275 -0.2923 -0.1736* -0.0551 -0.0186 
Number of  CCJ’s granted 0.0165 0.0556 0.1630* 0.2726 0.3050 0.0418 0.0771 0.1921* 0.3106 0.3476 -0.0063 0.0315 0.1455* 0.2610 0.2978 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at greater than 1000 -0.0291 0.0025 0.0934* 0.1875 0.2130 -0.0411 -0.0098 0.0919 0.1945 0.2244 -0.0741 -0.0499 0.0458 0.1431 0.1696 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at less  than 251 -0.0844 -0.0625 0.0197 0.1018 0.1326 -0.0228 -0.0026 0.0838 0.1749 0.2055 -0.0907 -0.0675 0.0167 0.1025 0.1342 
R-squared 
Rbar-squared 
0.4311 
0.4247 
0.4040 
0.3973 
0.3977 
0.3908 
a A ‘*’ next to the mean effect estimate indicates that the variable is considered statistically significant at the 95% level. 
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Table 3: Results - Theft of a Car 
 
Direct  Effects 
2003  2004  2005 
 
Variable Namea Lower 99%         Lower 95%  Coefficient        Upper 95%         Upper 99%  Lower 99%         Lower 95%  Coefficient        Upper 95%         Upper 99%  Lower 99%         Lower  95%  Coefficient        Upper 95%         Upper 99% 
 
 
Average weekly income 
 
-0.3168 
 
-0.2938 
 
-0.2270* 
 
-0.1612 
 
-0.1394 
 
-0.2834 
 
-0.2591 
 
-0.1877* 
 
-0.1147 
 
-0.0948 
 
-0.3609 
 
-0.3361 
 
-0.2648* 
 
-0.1903 
 
-0.1657 
Percentage of  pop. aged  0-15 -0.1113 -0.0916 -0.0379 0.0157 0.0329 -0.1313 -0.1146 -0.0563 0.0031 0.0207 -0.0703 -0.0520 0.0061 0.0666 0.0866 
Percentage of  pop. male aged  0-15 -0.1333 -0.1174 -0.0702* -0.0239 -0.0116 -0.1057 -0.0921 -0.0399 0.0116 0.0266 -0.1302 -0.1159 -0.0609* -0.0078 0.0092 
%  of  males in population -0.0813 -0.0662 -0.0144 0.0380 0.0512 -0.1222 -0.1070 -0.0518 0.0037 0.0213 -0.0904 -0.0718 -0.0183 0.0350 0.0549 
%  OAPs in population -0.1820 -0.1605 -0.0918* -0.0267 -0.0073 -0.2285 -0.2042 -0.1327* -0.0593 -0.0370 -0.2033 -0.1803 -0.1103* -0.0403 -0.0180 
Houses in poor condition 0.0702 0.0874 0.1492* 0.2089 0.2313 0.0370 0.0594 0.1283* 0.1938 0.2182 0.0828 0.1038 0.1654* 0.2277 0.2501 
Net change in population -0.1199 -0.1020 -0.0484 0.0049 0.0209 -0.0754 -0.0579 -0.0009 0.0566 0.0789 -0.0342 -0.0183 0.0382 0.0958 0.1150 
Net inflow 15  to 24 0.0655 0.0910 0.1632* 0.2229 0.2405 -0.0495 -0.0349 0.0147 0.0732 0.0950 -0.0036 0.0166 0.0809* 0.1458 0.1639 
Population density -0.3166 -0.2960 -0.2388* -0.1842 -0.1631 -0.3095 -0.2917 -0.2348* -0.1766 -0.1588 -0.3340 -0.3163 -0.2575* -0.1989 -0.1839 
Number of  CCJ’s granted 0.0539 0.0691 0.1209* 0.1746 0.1925 0.0247 0.0428 0.1068* 0.1694 0.1903 -0.0066 0.0147 0.0738* 0.1345 0.1540 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at greater than 1000 -0.0606 -0.0453 0.0044 0.0524 0.0670 -0.0814 -0.0623 -0.0067 0.0469 0.0667 -0.0506 -0.0344 0.0183 0.0717 0.0870 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at less  than 251 -0.0533 -0.0381 0.0066 0.0499 0.0639 -0.0547 -0.0392 0.0088 0.0566 0.0749 -0.0195 -0.0023 0.0446 0.0921 0.1087 
 
Indirect  Effects 
2003  2004  2005 
 
Variable Name Lower 99%         Lower 95%  Coefficient        Upper 95%         Upper 99%  Lower 99%         Lower 95%  Coefficient        Upper 95%         Upper 99%  Lower 99%         Lower 95%  Coefficient        Upper 95%         Upper 99% 
 
 
Average weekly income 
 
-0.5922 
 
-0.5305 
 
-0.3716* 
 
-0.2476 
 
-0.2129 
 
-0.5478 
 
-0.4902 
 
-0.3273* 
 
-0.1897 
 
-0.1507 
 
-0.5589 
 
-0.5075 
 
-0.3665* 
 
-0.2492 
 
-0.2152 
Percentage of  pop. aged  0-15 -0.1892 -0.1560 -0.0620 0.0257 0.0555 -0.2470 -0.2094 -0.0981 0.0054 0.0387 -0.0977 -0.0733 0.0085 0.0942 0.1270 
Percentage of  pop. male aged  0-15 -0.2382 -0.2059 -0.1151* -0.0392 -0.0182 -0.2004 -0.1638 -0.0694 0.0198 0.0463 -0.1918 -0.1649 -0.0843* -0.0110 0.0134 
%  of  males in population -0.1445 -0.1111 -0.0236 0.0613 0.0888 -0.2333 -0.1962 -0.0905 0.0066 0.0387 -0.1272 -0.1006 -0.0253 0.0474 0.0751 
%  OAPs in population -0.3231 -0.2742 -0.1504* -0.0421 -0.0111 -0.4458 -0.3819 -0.2318* -0.0998 -0.0618 -0.3009 -0.2608 -0.1527* -0.0558 -0.0225 
Houses in poor condition 0.1101 0.1373 0.2442* 0.3651 0.4191 0.0648 0.1031 0.2237* 0.3600 0.4257 0.1038 0.1373 0.2289* 0.3362 0.3707 
Net change in population -0.2004 -0.1746 -0.0792 0.0079 0.0351 -0.1404 -0.1055 -0.0015 0.1032 0.1397 -0.0469 -0.0253 0.0530 0.1367 0.1654 
Net inflow 15  to 24 0.0980 0.1441 0.2673* 0.3965 0.4379 -0.0880 -0.0608 0.0255 0.1289 0.1706 -0.0046 0.0228 0.1117* 0.2083 0.2423 
Population density -0.5864 -0.5286 -0.3910* -0.2746 -0.2477 -0.6304 -0.5621 -0.4097* -0.2799 -0.2454 -0.5234 -0.4829 -0.3565* -0.2497 -0.2187 
Number of  CCJ’s granted 0.0852 0.1066 0.1980* 0.3070 0.3518 0.0390 0.0732 0.1863* 0.3149 0.3568 -0.0095 0.0199 0.1023* 0.1941 0.2269 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at greater than 1000 -0.1000 -0.0765 0.0071 0.0859 0.1115 -0.1461 -0.1091 -0.0116 0.0826 0.1167 -0.0700 -0.0477 0.0253 0.1011 0.1235 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at less  than 251 -0.0918 -0.0625 0.0108 0.0827 0.1083 -0.0971 -0.0695 0.0155 0.0997 0.1386 -0.0281 -0.0030 0.0620 0.1356 0.1606 
Total Effects 
2003  2004  2005 
 
Variable Name Lower 99%         Lower 95%  Coefficient        Upper 95%         Upper 99%  Lower 99%         Lower 95%  Coefficient        Upper 95%         Upper 99%  Lower 99%         Lower 95%  Coefficient        Upper 95%         Upper 99% 
 
 
Average weekly income -0.8846 -0.8144 -0.5986* -0.4140 -0.3573 -0.8144 -0.7439 -0.5150* -0.3068 -0.2423 -0.9035 -0.8292 -0.6312* -0.4470 -0.3872 
Percentage of  pop. aged  0-15 -0.2996 -0.2464 -0.0999 0.0415 0.0894 -0.3716 -0.3223 -0.1543 0.0082 0.0599 -0.1674 -0.1250 0.0146 0.1597 0.2129 
Percentage of  pop. male aged  0-15 -0.3708 -0.3193 -0.1853* -0.0633 -0.0305 -0.3031 -0.2530 -0.1093 0.0311 0.0723 -0.3169 -0.2785 -0.1452* -0.0189 0.0229 
%  of  males in population -0.2240 -0.1765 -0.0380 0.1004 0.1401 -0.3550 -0.3016 -0.1423 0.0102 0.0598 -0.2178 -0.1722 -0.0436 0.0819 0.1310 
%  OAPs in population -0.4965 -0.4314 -0.2422* -0.0676 -0.0187 -0.6650 -0.5784 -0.3645* -0.1597 -0.0966 -0.4954 -0.4342 -0.2630* -0.0986 -0.0405 
Houses in poor condition 0.1784 0.2249 0.3934* 0.5658 0.6337 0.1036 0.1636 0.3520* 0.5488 0.6320 0.1888 0.2443 0.3943* 0.5625 0.6144 
Net change in population -0.3159 -0.2740 -0.1276 0.0128 0.0574 -0.2133 -0.1605 -0.0024 0.1593 0.2149 -0.0806 -0.0431 0.0913 0.2310 0.2793 
Net inflow 15  to 24 0.1648 0.2403 0.4305* 0.6119 0.6612 -0.1364 -0.0959 0.0402 0.2032 0.2587 -0.0082 0.0399 0.1926* 0.3496 0.3939 
Population density -0.8792 -0.8127 -0.6298* -0.4663 -0.4193 -0.9328 -0.8450 -0.6444* -0.4646 -0.4085 -0.8425 -0.7922 -0.6140* -0.4559 -0.4102 
Number of  CCJ’s granted 0.1385 0.1763 0.3188* 0.4747 0.5413 0.0653 0.1172 0.2930* 0.4807 0.5420 -0.0161 0.0352 0.1760* 0.3250 0.3771 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at greater than 1000 -0.1576 -0.1221 0.0115 0.1386 0.1806 -0.2264 -0.1717 -0.0182 0.1286 0.1846 -0.1191 -0.0829 0.0436 0.1720 0.2084 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at less  than 251 -0.1433 -0.1003 0.0174 0.1330 0.1709 -0.1525 -0.1090 0.0244 0.1554 0.2181 -0.0456 -0.0054 0.1066 0.2254 0.2671 
R-squared 
Rbar-squared 
0.2742 
0.2660 
0.4023 0.3443 
a A ‘*’ next to the mean effect estimate indicates that the variable is considered statistically significant at the 95% level. 
 
 
Lower 99% 
 
Lower 95% 
 
Coefficient 
 
Upper 95% 
 
Upper 99% 
 
Lower 99% 
 
Lower 95% 
 
Coefficient 
 
Upper 95% 
 
Upper 99% 
 
Lower 99% 
 
Lower 95% 
 
Coefficient 
 
Upper 95% 
 
Upper 99% 
 
30 
 
 
 
Table 4: Results - Burglary 
 
Direct  Effects 
 2003     2004     2005   
Variable  Namea Lower 99% 
 
Lower 95% 
 
Coefficient 
 
Upper 95% 
 
Upper 99% 
 
Lower 99% 
 
Lower 95% 
 
Coefficient 
 
Upper 95% 
 
Upper 99% 
 
Lower 99% 
 
Lower  95% 
 
Coefficient 
 
Upper 95% 
 
Upper 99% 
 
Average weekly income 
 
-0.0724 
 
-0.0500 
 
0.0266 
 
0.1021 
 
0.1231 
 
0.0503 
 
0.0684 
 
0.1500* 
 
0.2300 
 
0.2558 
 
0.0673 
 
0.0944 
 
0.1803* 
 
0.2636 
 
0.2857 
Percentage of  pop. aged  0-15 -0.1865 -0.1665 -0.0988* -0.0302 -0.0082 -0.3143 -0.2915 -0.2154* -0.1448 -0.1201 -0.1968 -0.1770 -0.0999* -0.0231 -0.0008 
Percentage of  pop. male aged  0-15 -0.1135 -0.0900 -0.0328 0.0283 0.0500 -0.1367 -0.1173 -0.0566 0.0019 0.0213 -0.1332 -0.1112 -0.0466 0.0171 0.0385 
%  of  males in population -0.1019 -0.0817 -0.0195 0.0431 0.0604 -0.2102 -0.1890 -0.1279* -0.0681 -0.0513 -0.1017 -0.0835 -0.0201 0.0443 0.0618 
%  OAPs in population -0.1659 -0.1415 -0.0634 0.0139 0.0417 -0.1903 -0.1649 -0.0842* -0.0043 0.0174 -0.0984 -0.0734 0.0105 0.0943 0.1204 
Houses in poor condition 0.0317 0.0524 0.1201* 0.1886 0.2069 0.0270 0.0482 0.1230* 0.1979 0.2186 -0.0162 0.0092 0.0870* 0.1665 0.1878 
Net change in population -0.1707 -0.1518 -0.0911* -0.0283 -0.0097 -0.1354 -0.1164 -0.0562 0.0056 0.0246 -0.1275 -0.1050 -0.0422 0.0237 0.0433 
Net inflow 15  to 24 0.0188 0.0346 0.1069* 0.1928 0.2306 0.0394 0.0645 0.1478* 0.2298 0.2642 0.0874 0.1321 0.2388* 0.3504 0.3815 
Population density -0.1623 -0.1424 -0.0791* -0.0141 0.0086 -0.2209 -0.1962 -0.1221* -0.0482 -0.0273 -0.1717 -0.1467 -0.0691* 0.0085 0.0355 
Number of  CCJ’s granted -0.0025 0.0176 0.0761* 0.1370 0.1533 0.0191 0.0412 0.1087* 0.1740 0.1959 -0.0233 -0.0003 0.0718 0.1438 0.1652 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at greater than 1000 -0.0706 -0.0498 0.0058 0.0619 0.0810 -0.0192 -0.0017 0.0513 0.1047 0.1211 -0.0826 -0.0663 -0.0093 0.0483 0.0647 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at less  than 251 -0.0804 -0.0654 -0.0140 0.0341 0.0506 0.0096 0.0253 0.0735* 0.1219 0.1384 0.0015 0.0184 0.0708* 0.1240 0.1386 
 
Indirect  Effects 
2003  2004  2005 
 
 
Variable  Name Lower 99% 
 
Lower 95% 
 
Coefficient 
 
Upper 95% 
 
Upper 99% 
 
Lower 99% 
 
Lower 95% 
 
Coefficient 
 
Upper 95% 
 
Upper 99% 
 
Lower 99% 
 
Lower 95% 
 
Coefficient 
 
Upper 95% 
 
Upper 99% 
 
Average weekly income 
 
-0.1403 
 
-0.0931 
 
0.0492 
 
0.1904 
 
0.2430 
 
-0.9269 
 
-0.8281 
 
-0.5098* 
 
-0.2127 
 
-0.1193 
 
-0.9173 
 
-0.7875 
 
-0.4601* 
 
-0.1529 
 
-0.0508 
Percentage of  pop. aged  0-15 -0.3722 -0.3269 -0.1829* -0.0547 -0.0146 -0.6358 -0.5293 -0.2337 0.0366 0.1070 -0.1683 -0.0633 0.2204 0.5126 0.6107 
Percentage of  pop. male aged  0-15 -0.2113 -0.1736 -0.0607 0.0543 0.0880 -0.2106 -0.1299 0.0820 0.2943 0.3688 -0.3063 -0.2290 0.0120 0.2576 0.3340 
%  of  males in population -0.2073 -0.1564 -0.0363 0.0805 0.1195 -0.4532 -0.3774 -0.1331 0.0959 0.1729 -0.4469 -0.3484 -0.0882 0.1577 0.2494 
%  OAPs in population -0.3259 -0.2714 -0.1175 0.0255 0.0757 -0.6308 -0.5247 -0.2175 0.0749 0.1466 -0.3646 -0.2469 0.0780 0.4167 0.5191 
Houses in poor condition 0.0588 0.0924 0.2219* 0.3671 0.4198 -0.0919 -0.0061 0.2714 0.5695 0.6743 -0.1468 -0.0348 0.2853 0.6154 0.7567 
Net change in population -0.3419 -0.2974 -0.1683* -0.0507 -0.0169 -0.3430 -0.2361 0.0383 0.3125 0.3870 -0.4161 -0.2942 0.0288 0.3532 0.4503 
Net inflow 15  to 24 0.0346 0.0618 0.1975* 0.3705 0.4433 -0.4080 -0.3177 -0.0540 0.2087 0.3028 -0.1625 -0.0661 0.2378 0.5778 0.7008 
Population density -0.3222 -0.2762 -0.1460* -0.0255 0.0154 -0.3292 -0.2555 0.0141 0.2665 0.3406 -0.1420 -0.0592 0.2503 0.5628 0.6682 
Number of  CCJ’s granted -0.0039 0.0317 0.1408* 0.2641 0.3079 -0.3264 -0.2339 -0.0111 0.2146 0.2885 -0.3708 -0.2859 -0.0238 0.2306 0.3261 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at greater than 1000 -0.1315 -0.0929 0.0109 0.1178 0.1562 -0.0454 0.0301 0.2804* 0.5347 0.6174 0.0467 0.1178 0.3648* 0.6293 0.7204 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at less  than 251 -0.1604 -0.1235 -0.0257 0.0620 0.0938 0.1323 0.2185 0.4737* 0.7548 0.8429 0.1387 0.2224 0.4631* 0.7343 0.8362 
Total Effects 
2003  2004  2005 
 
Variable Name 
 
 
Average weekly income -0.2096 -0.1432 0.0759 0.2928 0.3607 -0.8119 -0.6920 -0.3598* -0.0403 0.0518 -0.7541 -0.6283 -0.2797 0.0487 0.1405 
Percentage of  pop. aged  0-15 -0.5489 -0.4904 -0.2816* -0.0848 -0.0228 -0.8887 -0.7653 -0.4490* -0.1618 -0.0774 -0.2793 -0.1852 0.1205 0.4338 0.5352 
Percentage of  pop. male aged  0-15 -0.3215 -0.2606 -0.0935 0.0835 0.1381 -0.2883 -0.2091 0.0254 0.2559 0.3187 -0.3817 -0.2965 -0.0346 0.2302 0.3112 
%  of  males in population -0.3028 -0.2382 -0.0557 0.1228 0.1781 -0.6012 -0.5158 -0.2610* -0.0161 0.0710 -0.4829 -0.3900 -0.1083 0.1575 0.2396 
%  OAPs in population -0.4780 -0.4120 -0.1808 0.0396 0.1173 -0.7407 -0.6385 -0.3016 0.0186 0.1004 -0.3854 -0.2609 0.0886 0.4476 0.5747 
Houses in poor condition 0.0928 0.1463 0.3420* 0.5538 0.6097 0.0056 0.0933 0.3944* 0.7157 0.8176 -0.0904 0.0266 0.3722* 0.7268 0.8686 
Net change in population -0.5038 -0.4481 -0.2593* -0.0797 -0.0258 -0.4449 -0.3219 -0.0179 0.2847 0.3747 -0.4921 -0.3730 -0.0134 0.3373 0.4483 
Net inflow 15  to 24 0.0546 0.0964 0.3045* 0.5645 0.6705 -0.3113 -0.2155 0.0938 0.4009 0.4968 -0.0030 0.1064 0.4766* 0.8678 1.0251 
Population density -0.4795 -0.4144 -0.2250* -0.0396 0.0240 -0.4721 -0.4007 -0.1080 0.1633 0.2388 -0.2390 -0.1420 0.1812 0.5130 0.6213 
Number of  CCJ’s granted -0.0064 0.0486 0.2169* 0.3958 0.4572 -0.2438 -0.1431 0.0976 0.3412 0.4161 -0.3094 -0.2225 0.0480 0.3194 0.4045 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at greater than 1000 -0.2002 -0.1422 0.0167 0.1781 0.2368 -0.0203 0.0504 0.3316* 0.6137 0.7064 0.0110 0.0933 0.3556* 0.6427 0.7311 
%  of  CCJ’s valued at less  than 251 -0.2380 -0.1878 -0.0397 0.0961 0.1461 0.1708 0.2636 0.5472* 0.8530 0.9511 0.1697 0.2697 0.5338* 0.8238 0.9444 
 
